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Abstract
The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky (1870–1965) considered himself a
Leibnizian of sorts. He accepted parts of Leibniz’s doctrine ofmonads, although he preferred
to call them ‘substantival agents’ and rejected the thesis that they have neither doors nor
windows. In Lossky’s own doctrine, monads have existed since the beginning of time, they
are immortal, and can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their
behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of
creatures of a higher level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a monad can
evolve by being progressively reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of
metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of
human beings or even higher. Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered
elements of such a systematic doctrine of reincarnation. He attempts to reconstitute this
doctrine in an article that appeared both in Russian and German in 1931. The Russian
version, ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’ (‘Uchenie Lejbnica o
perevoploshhenii kak metamorfoze’), was published in the Сборникъ Русскаго
института въ Прагѣ (Sbornik Russkago instituta v Pragě), vol. 2, 1931, pp. 77–88.
The German version appeared under the title ‘Leibniz’ Lehre von der Reinkarnation als
Metamorphose,’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 40, n. 2, 1931, pp. 214–226.
The content of the Russian and German versions is roughly the same, except for the
omission, in the German version, of a mention of David Hume in the second sentence
and of one paragraph and a half at the end of the article. The following is a translation of this
article. I translated the text from the Russian version, which was in all appearances written
first, but I also took the German version into account. The original pagination is added in
angle brackets. Angle brackets are used wherever the additions are mine. — Frédéric
Tremblay
Sophia (2020) 59:755–766
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<77> The doctrine of reincarnation is widespread in philosophy, in the religious beliefs
of various peoples, and in the worldviews of individuals. Among its supporters were
thinkers such as Plato, Plotinus, Origen, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, <Gotthold
Ephraim> Lessing, <Johann Gottfried> Herder, D. Hume, <Arthur> Schopenhauer,
<Charles> Renouvier, <Ralph Waldo> Emerson, <August> Cieszkowski, <Wincenty>
Lutosławski, <Alexei> Kozlov and many others. Nevertheless, it does not enjoy a good
reputation; it seems naive, coarse, and contrary to Christianity. No wonder! It is usually
expressed in a fragmentary, sketchy form, often in combination with an admixture of
fantastic ideas. Yet it could be developed in the form of a seriously grounded system of
valuable and fertile doctrines. The foundations for such a development are already
contained in Leibniz’s philosophy, even though, strangely, this aspect of Leibniz’s
system usually remains unnoticed both in general surveys of the history of philosophy
and in monographs.
The purpose of this article is to show that the fundamental principles of Leibniz’s
monadology commit him to a doctrine of reincarnation and that such a doctrine is in
fact already contained in his philosophy. For the sake of brevity, I will not examine the
history of the development of Leibniz’s thought, but, steering clear of controversial
issues, I will mainly focus on the final stage of his monadology.
According to Leibniz, the world is constituted of substances that he calls monads.
Every monad is an inextended, individual, i.e., an unrepeatable singular agent, the life
of which consists of a purposeful change of representations. Every monad represents
the world from a specific individual point of view. So, every monad is a microcosm, a
mirror of the universe. This does not mean, however, that they are all equally perfect.
The representations, of which their lives consist, can either be clear or confused; they
can either be apperceptions, i.e., conscious representations, or mere perceptions, i.e.,
unconscious representations. <78> All monads can be ordered in a series according to
their level of perfection, i.e., according to their level of consciousness, depending on the
degree of clarity of their representations and the number of clear representations that
they have. At the very bottom of this series are monads in which there is not a single
conscious representation. These are sleeping monads. Applying Leibniz’s monadology
to modern theories, we can say that those monads lying at the basis of inorganic matter
are, for instance, monads whose activities are known in the form of electrons, atoms,
and molecules of inorganic matter. Above are monads capable, in conjunction with
other monads subordinate to them, of having clear and distinct percipience, sensations
accompanied by memories. ‘Such a living being is called an animal, and his monad is
called a soul.’1 Above animals are rational souls or spirits. But, even in spirits, e.g., in
the monad of a human being, not all representations are given in a clear, conscious
form. The highest level of perfection, where clarity of representation is complete, is
unique to God, the highermost of monads.
1 Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison, § 4, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 599
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Insofar as their life consists in changes of strivings and representations, monads are
souls, or at least analogues of souls. But, at the same time, they are also bodies, or, more
accurately, they also actualize bodily processes. Leibniz, as is well known, denies the
substantiality of matter and admits only the existence of material processes. The body
of each monad is the manifestation of its limitations, which is expressed in the ‘passive
force of resistance’ (‘which involves impenetrability and something more’).2 This
aspect of the monad Leibniz calls ‘materia prima’ (primary matter).3 In this sense of
the word, the body is an integral appurtenance of every monad; it is expressed in <the
form of> an impenetrable extension and in the processes of motion that are subordinate
to the laws of mechanics. Insofar as the monads are souls, a purposeful change of
representations occurs in them, which is explainable teleologically, according to the
law ‘of the final causes of good and evil.’4 But, insofar as monads are bodies, their
changes are explainable by mechanical causes, since ‘the changes of the bodies and the
external phenomena originate from one another by the laws of efficient causes, i.e., of
movements.’5 As Leibniz says, ‘[i]t is as if there were two realms, one of efficient
causes, the other of final ones, each of which alone is sufficient to account for
everything in detail, as if the other did not exist.’6 In fact, the processes of these two
realms run parallel to each <79> other, without entering in interaction and being
coordinated with each other only through pre-established harmony.7
In addition to <the word> ‘corporeality’ in the sense of a series of mechanical
processes, Leibniz uses the word ‘corps’ (body) in yet another sense, which is
particularly important from the point of view of the topic of my article. Every monad
is, in accordance with its degree of perfection, connected (according to the pre-
established harmony) to a greater or lesser number of other, less perfect monads
subordinate to it, which serve it as if they were its organs. This relation of subordina-
tion, this vinculum substantiale, makes out of many simple substances, as it were, a
new, composite substance.8 In such a composite substance, the aggregate of monads
that are subordinate to the central dominant monad may be called the body of the
central monad.9 Leibniz calls this <kind of> body ‘materia secunda’ (secondary
matter).
The secondary matter differs radically from the primary, as can be seen from
the following explanations from Leibniz: ‘The primary matter is essential
(essentialis) for every entelechy’ (i.e., monads)10 and ‘can never be separated
from it,’11 so it is the ‘passive potency’12 of a limited substance; ‘but the
2 De ipsa natura, § 11, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 510
3 De ipsa natura, § 11, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 510
4 Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison, § 3, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 599
5 Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison, § 3, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 599
6 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 542
7 Interesting for an accurate interpretation of Leibniz’s system is the question of whether the series of
mechanical processes should be understood in the spirit of psychological idealism or in the sense of dynamic
realism. I will leave this question aside, since it is not important for my topic. On this question, see: Eduard
von Hartmann, Geschichte der Metaphysik.
8 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 483; ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ 23, vol. III, 1713, II, p. 482
9 Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison, Gerhardt, vol. VI, § 3
10 <In the German version, Lossky writes ‘the soul of the monad’ instead of ‘monads.’>
11 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ 16, X, 1706, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 324
12 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ 16, X, 1706, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 324
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secondary matter, which forms the organic body (corpus organicum), is the result
of innumerable complete substances, each of which has its own entelechy and its
primary matter.’13 ‘Entelechies change their own organic bodies, i.e., their sec-
ondary matter; but their primary matter does not change.’14
Death is nothing but the separation of the central monad from all or most of the
monads subordinate to it. In fact, the central monad itself, and in general every monad,
cannot, as such, be annihilated; it cannot pass away into the realm of nonbeing. Every
monad is immortal, because, having a true unity, it can neither have a beginning nor an
end, except by means of a ‘miracle.’ It follows from this ‘that the constituent forms of
substances have been created with the world, and that they subsist permanently.’15 The
immortality of the monad is assured by its very God-created nature; it is not ‘merely a
miracle of divine grace.’16 On the contrary, <80> the annihilation of a monad can only
be a miraculous act of divine omnipotence.
Existing from the beginning of the universe to its end, every monad is always active;
it is ἄτομον αὐτοπληροῦν (a self-fulfilling atom), an atomon vitale (a living atom).17
Its tireless activity is not a pointless monotonous trampling in the same place; by
realizing purposeful acts, it is always perfecting itself. As Leibniz says, ‘[t]hroughout
the universe there is an uninterrupted and free progress, through which the state of the
world is always improved.’18 And, ‘although we sometimes step back, like the lines
with reversal points, in the end advancement does not fail to prevail and to succeed.’19
‘And as for the objection that might be raised that, if this were the case, the world
would have become a paradise a long time ago, the ready answer is: even if the
majority of the substances were perfected, there would still be, due to the infinite
divisibility of the continuum, some parts remaining dormant in the infinite abyss of
things, which should awake and rise to a higher and better and, so to speak, improved
culture.’20
Since every monad that has ascended from the bottom and has reached a certain
degree of perfection subordinates at least some monads, which serve it as organs and
with which it forms an organism, we find, looking over nature from top to bottom,
according to the stages of the perfection of the monads, that nature is infinitely
13 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ 16, X, 1706, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 324
14 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ 16, X, 1706, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 324; see also ‘Leibniz an de Volder,’ 20, VI,
1703, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 252. <The following note was added in the German version: ‘The expressions
“primary and secondary matter” have a different meaning in other writings of Leibniz, but this question need
not be addressed for the purpose of this essay.’>
15 Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l’union qu’il y a
entre l’âme et le corps, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 479
16 Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, Préface, Gerhardt, vol. V. <Note from the translator: Lossky
does not provide the page number here, but this is apparently from pages 60–61, where Leibniz writes: ‘en
vertu d’une grace miraculeuse fondée dans la seule promesse de Dieu qu’elles ne meurent point.’>
17 ‘Leibniz an de Volder,’ XVI, July 6, 1701, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 224
18 De rerum originatione radicali, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 308. <Note from the translator: This seems to be a
very loose translation of: ‘In cumulum etiam pulchritudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum,
progressus quidam perpetuus liberrimusque totius Universi est agnoscendus, ita it ad majorem semper cultum
procedat.’>
19 ‘Leibniz an die Königin Sophie Charlotte von Preußen. Lettre touchant ce qui est independant des Sens et
de la Matiere,’ Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 508
20 De rerum originatione radicali, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 308. ‘Leibniz an die Khurfürstin Sophie,’ vol. VII, p.
543 ff.; ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ vol. II, p. 300
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organized and that this organization has its ultimate ground in God, that is to say, in the
harmony that he has pre-established. ‘Matter,’ Leibniz says, ‘arranged by a divine
wisdom must everywhere be essentially organized.’21 There are ‘so many envelopes
and so many organic bodies that are enveloped into one another that one could never
produce an organic body completely anew and without any preformation, and that one
could as little entirely destroy an already subsisting animal.’22 ‘Death, just as much as
generation, is nothing else than the transformation of one and the same animated
creature (animal), which at one time is increased, and at another time diminished.’23
During the entire period from the birth of an animal to its death, its body undergoes
gradual changes; some subordinate monads break away from the composition of the
body and new ones enter it, subordinating themselves to the central monad, the soul of
the living being. These are the changes that <81> are nowadays studied by physiology
as the metabolisms of organisms. Death and birth are, according to Leibniz, nothing but
accelerated metabolisms that have an abrupt leapy character. In the case of death,
Leibniz says, ‘not only the soul, but also the animal itself and its organic machine are
preserved, even though the destruction of the coarse parts has reduced it to a smallness
that escapes our senses no less than it did before its birth.’24
Even if a living being is burnt, there still remains in its ashes a microscopic
organized being25; an embryo from which a new living being could emerge over time,
because ‘apparent generation is only a development and a kind of increase.’26
An animal (or a plant),27 reduced through death to the level of a microscopic being,
develops a new visible body through the process of birth. Is this body of the same
species as the previous one, or of a new species? Leibniz says that Frans Mercurius van
Helmont claims that, when an animal dies, it is reborn in the body of a newborn of the
same species, so that the number of humans, dogs, cats, etc., neither decreases nor
increases.28 Leibniz concedes that a living being can develop the body of the same
species several times, but he does not at all consider monads to be doomed to
everlastingly repeat one and the same kind of life at every birth. The following
considerations and statements by Leibniz himself can ascertain that he admitted the
ascension of monads from lower kinds of life to higher ones:
1. According to Leibniz, every monad is continuously perfecting itself and the
outcome of this perfectionment is entrance into the Kingdom of God.29
2. He designates his doctrine by the terms metamorphosis, transformation,30 and
metaschematism, and illustrates it by means of the example of the metamorphosis
21 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 544
22 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 544
23 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 543
24 Système nouveau de la nature, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 480; Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en
raison, § 6, Gerhardt, vol. VI; Monadologie, §§ 72, 73, Gerhardt, vol. VI
25 ‘Leibniz an Arnauld,’ September 1687, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 124
26 Système nouveau de la nature, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 480
27 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 543; ‘Leibniz an
des Maiseaux,’ vol. VII, p. 535
28 ‘Leibniz an Th. Burnett,’ January 20, 1699; Gerhardt, vol. III, p. 252 ff.
29 De rerum originatione radicali, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 308
30 <Note from the translator: In the German version, Lossky added the following footnote: ‘The expression
“transformatio” occurs in Système nouveau, Gerhardt vol. IV, pp. 474 and 480–481.’>
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of caterpillars and other insects, obviously to show that the new body can sharply
differ from the former, while the central monad remains the same.
3. Even about spermatic animalcules, he claims ‘that they themselves stem from other
even smaller spermatic animalcules.’31
4. Such a profound transformation as the transition from the kingdom of slumber to
the kingdom of awakened monads, according to Leibniz, necessarily arises through
a process of development.32 <82>
5. Moreover, he even considers possible the transition of monads from the animal
kingdom to the kingdom of rational beings (such as a monad, which is destined to
become a human being, migrates from the stage of a merely sensitive soul into that
of a rational spirit—this will be discussed later).33
6. Finally, in the Monadology Leibniz definitively says that the organic body of an
animal that exists before conception is not created anew by conception, but ‘was
only disposed to undergo a great transformation so that it may become an animal of
another species.’34 In a letter to <Rudolf Christian> Wagner, he says: ‘species
animalis non manet.’35
If Leibniz had resolutely and definitively emphasized these doctrines, he would thereby
have laid the foundation, long before Darwin, for a theory of evolution much more
profound than Darwinism.
The transition from animal nature to human nature, as the nature of a rational being,
and, furthermore, the destiny of human beings, are subordinate to laws other <than
those of the animal kingdom>.36 The immortality of pre-human beings is, because of
their lack of self-consciousness, merely the preservation of the metaphysical identity of
the monad. As for the human, rational soul capable of saying ‘I,’ it does not only
‘subsist metaphysically, although it does so to a greater extent than the others, but it
also remains morally the same and constitutes the same personality.’37 It is memory and
self-consciousness that ‘render it capable of punishment and reward.’38 These are souls
created in the image and likeness of God. This is why Leibniz says that he does not dare
‘to affirm anything with regards to either the preexistence or the details of the future
state of human souls, since God could use in this respect extraordinary means in the
kingdom of grace. Nevertheless, one must prefer what is favored by natural reason,
unless revelation teaches us the contrary — a problem that I do not intend to solve
here.’39
For our topic, it is important to know what Leibniz thinks, on the basis of natural
reason, about the state of the human monad before the birth of a human person. In the
developed system of monadology, consequential intellectual development necessarily
leads to the doctrine of the preexistence of souls. And, in fact, Leibniz himself says that,
31 Considérations sur la doctrine d’un Esprit Universel Unique, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 534
32 De rerum originatione radicali, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 308
33 Principes de la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison, Gerhardt, vol. VI, § 4, pp. 599 ff.
34 Monadologie, Gerhardt, vol. VI, § 74, p. 619 ff.
35 ‘Leibniz an R. Ch. Wagner,’ April 4, 1710, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 530
36 <Note from the translator: the words in angle brackets are present only in the German version.>
37 Discours de métaphysique, Gerhardt, vol. IV, pp. 459–460
38 Discours de métaphysique, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 460 ff., §§ 34, 36
39 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 545. ‘Leibniz an
Arnaud,’ September 1687, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 125
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during a period when his philosophy was still immature (cum nondum satis matura
esset philosophia mea), he adhered to the doctrine of the multiplication of souls through
traduction.40 <83>
Afterwards he began to affirm the preexistence of the human monad. In Theodicy,
after having expounded the above-mentioned doctrines on animals, he further argued as
follows: ‘After having established such a beautiful order, and such general rules with
regards to animals, it does not seem reasonable that man be completely excluded from
this and that everything that occurs in him with regards to his soul is done by <means
of> miracle.’41 ‘Therefore, I believe that the souls that will one day become human
souls, as well as those of other species, were in the seeds (dans les semences), and in the
ancestors back to Adam, and have thus always existed since the beginning of things in
some sort of organized body.’42 ‘But it also seems to me for many reasons acceptable
that they then existed only as sensitive (sensitives) or animal souls that were endowed
with perception and sensation, but destitute of reason, and that they remained in this
state until the time of the generation of man, to which they should belong, but that then
they received reason. Now, either there is a natural means to elevate a sensitive soul to
the degree of reasonable soul (which I have difficulty to conceive), or God gave reason
to this soul by a particular operation, or (if you wish) by a species of transcreation’43
(i.e., supplementary creation). ‘This explanation seems to remove the embarrassments
that arise here in philosophy and in theology, because it entirely dissipates the difficulty
of the origin of forms (i.e., the monads or substances), and because it is far more
appropriate to divine justice to give to the soul, already physically or animally corrupted
by Adam’s sin, the new perfection of reason, than to put a rational soul, through
creation or otherwise, into a body, where it must get morally corrupted.’44
In the third part of Theodicy, Leibniz says that the preexisting sensitive soul receives
reason at the moment of the conception of a human being by virtue of a special act of
God and by virtue of a predisposition that exists from the beginning, and that up to that
moment its organic body undergoes multiple changes.45
It should not be thought that the elevation of a soul by God up to the level of
rationality amounts to the creation of a new monad by Him; it is rather the same monad,
which existed since the beginning of the world, that acquires a new faculty. In this
regard, Leibniz remarks that ‘[i]t is agreed among the philosophers that the faculties of
40 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ April 24, 1709; Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 372. <Note from the translator: Here the word
‘traduction’ translates the Russian ‘традукцiя’ and the German ‘Traduktion,’ which Lossky uses to translate
Leibniz’s Latin word ‘traducem.’ This refers to the theological doctrine of traducianism, according to which
the human souls of newborn babies are generated, not by God, but by the souls of their parents at the moment
of conception much in the same manner as human bodies are generated. See: Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon
Philosophicum, Frankfurt am Main: typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti Pistorij,
1613, p. 1136.>
41 Essais de théodicée, part I, § 91, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 152
42 Essais de théodicée, part I, § 91, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 152
43 Essais de théodicée, part I, § 91, Gerhardt, vol. VI, pp. 152–153
44 Essais de théodicée, part I, § 91, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 153
45 Essais de théodicée, part III, § 397, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 352; see also ‘Leibniz an Arnaud,’ November 28,
1686; Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 75; ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ September 8, 1709, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 390; Causa Dei
asserta per justiniam ejus, Gerhardt, vol. VI, § 81, § 82. Principes de la nature et de la grâce, Gerhardt, vol.
VI, p. 601; Monadologie, § 82, Gerhardt, vol. VI
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sensation and of reason do not form separate souls within us, but rather inhere in one
and the same soul.’46 <84>
Everything that has been expounded so far seems to me to clearly show that Leibniz
was a supporter of the doctrine of reincarnation, with the reservations required by a
Christian worldview and by natural reason, taking into account the significance of the
transition from animalistic nature to reason. It is noteworthy, however, that Leibniz, in
presenting his theory, carefully dissociates it from the doctrine of the transmigration of
souls (metempsychosis) and does not fail to mention this in numerous places in his
works and letters.47 He points out that animals, even in death, do not completely lose
their bodies, but rather only transition to a new development and transformation of the
body. Consequently, one cannot speak of the transmigration of a soul from one body to
another; one can only speak of the metamorphosis of the animal, of its transformation.
He rejects such doctrines as, for instance, that of Fr. M. van Helmont, according to
which the soul of a moribund, having separated from the body, enters another body,
namely, the body of a newborn.48
He himself recognizes the kinship of his views with the ancient doctrine of the
transmigration of souls, which in his opinion is ‘nothing other than the doctrine of
transformation poorly understood.’49 Bayle also considers that ‘this hypothesis of
Leibniz is more or less similar to an opinion of the philosophers of Indostan.’50
The doctrine of reincarnation as a means of perfectionment leading to the heights of
being, is usually associated with the recognition of a plurality of stages of life leading
from the human being, not only downwards but also upwards. We also find this idea in
Leibniz: ‘It is reasonable also that there be substances capable of perception below us,
as there are such above us, and that our soul, far from being the last of all, finds itself in
a middle place whence we can descend and ascend. Otherwise, there would be a
deficiency of order, which some philosophers call vacuum formarum.’51 ‘[T]here is
an innumerable number of globes, as big or bigger than ours, that have just as much the
right to have rational inhabitants, even though these need not be human beings.’52
How diverse are the forms of life that Leibniz admitted is obvious from the
following examples: ‘Nothing prevents that there be animals (des animaux) in the
universe like the one that Cyrano de Bergerac found in the sun. The body of this
animal <85> consisted of a kind of fluid composed of an infinity of animalcules
capable of organizing themselves according to the desires of the grand animal,
who thereby instantaneously transformed itself, as it saw fit, and for whom
46 ‘Leibniz an des Bosses,’ July 31, 1709, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 378
47 See, e.g., ‘Leibniz an Arnauld,’ Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 99; vol. IV, pp. 474, 480; vol. VI, pp. 543, 601, 619.
48 ‘Leibniz an die Churfürstin Sophie von Hannover und an Sophie Charlotte, Churfürstin von Brandenburg
und Königin von Preußen,’ Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 539 ff.
49 ‘Leibniz an Arnauld,’ September 1687, Gerhardt, vol. II, p. 124
50 Leibniz, Éclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le système nouveau de l’union
de l’âme et du corps, Gerhardt, vol. IV, p. 528
51 Considérations sur les principes de vie, et sur les natures plastiques, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 543; ‘Leibniz an
des Maizeaux,’ July 8, 1711, Gerhardt, vol. VII, p. 535
52 Essais de theodicée, part I, § 19, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 114; Causa Dei, § 57, 58, Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 447
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dissolution of continuity was as little harmful as the stroke of a paddle could harm
the sea.’53
We often come across the doctrine of reincarnation among the philosophers who
followed Leibniz in developing a system of monadology, and this circumstance can also
be considered a confirmation of the fact that this doctrine is contained in Leibniz’s
philosophy, or at least consistently follows from its foundations. I will only mention the
names of such supporters of the doctrine of reincarnation, as <Johann Gottfried> Herder,
<Maximilian> Drossbach, <Charles> Renouvier, <Alexei> Kozlov, and <Wincenty>
Lutosławski. Unfortunately, the details of this doctrine are poorly developed by
Leibniz’s successors. Nevertheless, in the form in which it is given by Leibniz, it is of
great value, both in relation to the universal character that it bestows upon a whole
worldview and in its application to the solution of a number of particular problems. I will
make some remarks about this without going into the details, since developing the
details of this doctrine would require a separate book in connection with contemporary
philosophy and science, and not with the history of Leibniz’s thought. In the following
considerations, I will have in mind the variation of the monadology that I have
developed in my own writings.
Every individual, as a substantival agent, is immortal. Each of their lives, which take
the form of a series of metamorphoses, lasts throughout the entire world-process, so
that world-history is an organic unity of histories or, one might say, of biographies of
immortal individuals. When these individuals combine into an integral unity, such as an
animal organism or a plant, an anthill, a beehive, a state, church, etc., a central monad
stands at the head of such a unity, and the life of the whole has a personal individual
character.
In such a conception of the historical process, this personal, individual character is
asserted to the maximum extent possible. Materialistic, mechanical atomism also
considers every atom to be eternal and views the world-process (not as an organic
unity, but) as a sum of processes, each of which is the unbroken series of movements of
an eternal atom. However, in a mechanistic atomism, there can be no talk of the life
<86> of an atom, of its biography: atoms are uniform, bereft of any individual
characteristics; the series of changes in the movements and positions of each atom
are devoid of any meaning and purpose. There is here neither perfectionment nor
decadence in them. According to the monadological doctrine, in contrast, substantival
agents are individual, i.e., ontologically unrepeatable and axiologically irreplaceable.
Each one of them accomplishes purposeful actions, not only physically but also
psychically and spiritually. Each one of them is a potential personality capable of
becoming an actual personality, i.e., a rational and morally responsible being. The life
of such a being is a historical process, it deserves a biography. Such a metaphysical
system can be called a personalism, since its fundamental ontological element is
personality, or potential personality.
53 Essais de theodicée, part III, § 343; Gerhardt, vol. VI, p. 318. On the journey of a man on the moon (while
discussing a book of the Bishop of Chester Wilkins), Leibniz remarks that it is not possible in the present state
of humans, because of the properties of the air. ‘Leibniz an Basnage,’ June 15, 1708; Gerhardt, vol. III, p. 147.
On the possibility of celestial bodies on which the geniuses have a greater right than us to participate in affairs
of rational beings, ‘Leibniz an Coste,’ from December 19, 1707; Gerhardt, vol. III, p. 403. On the destruction
and reconstruction of the terrestrial globe, i.e., on a kind of death and rebirth of the earth, see:Monadologie, §
88.
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Even those thinkers who, in contrast to the materialist-mechanists, recognize the
activity of a personality irreducible to a mechanical process, if they deny the immor-
tality of the ‘I’ and the personal character of organic unity (e.g., the people, the state, the
church), they relegate the personal principle to a subordinate position in the historical
process. A series of mortal personalities that relay each other in time and that are
enclosed in an impersonal whole are subordinate to impersonal relations and forces to
such an extent that one cannot speak of the personal character of the historical process.
Concerning the question of what confers special value to the personal character of
the historical process, I answer the following. Personalist philosophy, combined with
the doctrine of the freedom of the will, asserts that each individual creates its own
destiny and is responsible for all the details of its own behavior: it has no right and no
reason to lay the blame on the milieu for its own shortcomings, to lay the blame on the
historical circumstances that were shaped before its birth, on the family in which it was
born, on heredity, etc.
This applies not only to the history of humanity but also to the evolution of the
animal and vegetal kingdoms, and to pre-human nature in general. According to this
doctrine, this is not a process of leaping from one mortal individual to another; it is a
unified history of the development of immortal individuals, who move forward,
perfecting themselves in the good or cultivating evil, partly by virtue of their own
creative ingenuity, partly by imitation and assimilation of other people’s creative acts.
Many entangled and paradoxical features of heredity could be explained with the
help of the doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis. Some character traits and
corporeal structures of the individual are inherited, not from the parents but from
themselves, precisely on the basis of their own experiences in previous lives. Maybe
this could explain, for instance, those characteristics whereby the individual is different
from its parents and is closer to remote ancestors. Other characteristics of the body can
be inherited from the <87> parents, insofar as the bodies of the parents participate in the
formation of the body of the embryo. Besides, the influence of the parents may be
much more profound; as the substantival agent (monad) dwells in the bodies of the
parents, in close organic connection with them, it learns about the way of life of the
parents, absorbing their innovations, which are the products of the rank and develop-
mental stage to which they belong.
In psychology, the doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis could be applied to
understand the nature of instincts, atavisms, and archaisms that Freud traces back to
intrauterine life, but that actually stretch back much farther.
This list of valuable applications of the doctrine of the metamorphoses of the
immortal individual is far from complete, but the completion and elaboration of the
details of this doctrine should be the subject of a separate work.54
The Catholic and Orthodox Church have traditionally adopted an unfavorable
attitude towards the doctrine of reincarnation. It is even possible that this
doctrine, in the form in which Origen developed it, was condemned during
the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In his History of the Councils of the Church,
54 I already hinted at the aforementioned doctrines in the following books: The World as an Organic Whole,
transl. by Natalie Duddington, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928; L’intuition, la matière et la vie, transl.
by M. Exempliarsky, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1928; Freedom of Will, transl. by Natalie Duddington, London:
Williams & Norgate, 1932; Value and Existence, transl. by Sergei Vinokooroff, London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1935.
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<Carl Josef von> Hefele says that the doctrine of Origen was condemned by an
edict of the Emperor Justinian, that the fifteen theses of Origen were
anathemized at the Constantinopolitan Synod in 543, and that, at the Fifth
Ecumenical Council, Origen’s doctrine has probably been subjected to anathe-
matizing without a detailed discussion and without the establishment of the
fifteen theses against it.55 However, it has never been condemned by the church
in the form developed by Leibniz, namely, in connection with the doctrine of
transcreation (of God’s supplementary act of creation). Such a distinguished
scholar and hierarch of the Catholic Church as Cardinal <Désiré-Joseph>
Mercier recognizes this in a letter to <Wincenty> Lutosławski, which has been
published by Lutosławski.56,57 It is true that Cardinal Mercier apparently wrote
his statement only reluctantly. Yet, all three fundamental theories about the
origin of the soul proposed in the Christian literature—creationism,
traducianism, and the doctrine of preexistence—cannot be considered satisfac-
tory58: they do not provide an answer to the question of hereditary sin and of
the fair conditions for the entrance of a nascent human being into earthly life
(birth from vicious or sickly parents, in an internally decomposed family, or
afflicted by poverty or the corrupting temptations of lubberly spent wealth,
etc.).
Only a more complex theory, including the doctrine of the preexistence of
the soul and of supplementary transcreation (a kind of <88> synthesis of the
theory of preexistence and the theory of creationism), gives an answer to these
questions while satisfying the requirements of fairness. For this, it is sufficient
to assume that all substantival agents were created by God at the <moment of
the> creation of the world as free beings endowed with creative activity and all
the faculties necessary for the realization of the absolute good. Those of them
who freely chose the path of love for God and for all His creatures, i.e., the
path of love for the absolute good, are awarded deification and belong to the
Kingdom of God. Those among them who embark on the path of self-love
constitute the kingdom of earthly (psycho-material) being; in this kingdom,
owing to the struggle of its members against each other, are unavoidable
countless imperfections, mental and physical suffering, death, etc., i.e., kinds
of evil that arise as a fair and natural consequence of the original sinful act.
55 Hefele, Carl Joseph von, Conciliengeschichte: Nach den Quellen bearbeitet, Zweiter Band, Zweite,
verbesserte Auflage, Freiburg: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung, 1875, p. 791
56 <Note from the translator: The correspondence that Lossky is referring to is a letter from Cardinal Mercier,
written on December 15, 1924, that Wincenty Lutosławski quoted from in The Knowledge of Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930, p. 173), where the Cardinal writes: ‘La question que vous
me soumettez est bien délicate. Je crois que l’opinion de la pré-existence et de la réincarnation, telle que vous
la présentez et dont vous vous dites subjectivement persuadé, n’est pas formellement condamnée comme
hérétique. Mais il est certain qu’elle va à l’encontre du sens chrétien et catholique. J’ai eu, j’ai encore égard, à
votre bonne foi personnelle et ne voudrai donc pas vous accuser d’hétérodoxie pour tenir à votre opinion; mais
présentée objectivement, je crois que la doctrine de la pré-existence et des réincarnations serait sujette à
condamnation, et je ne pourrais vous autoriser à la couvrir de mon patronage, d’aucune façon.’ Lutosławski
also discusses Mercier’s opinion in Pre-existence and Reincarnation, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1928, pp. 71–72.>
57 <Note from the translator: Everything that follows henceforth has been omitted in the German version.>
58 On this, see the work of Bishop <Kanevsky> Sylvester, Opyt pravoslavnago dogmaticheskago bogosloviya
(Essay on Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 337–339
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Such agents condemned themselves to a long and difficult path of development,
in which every position they occupy corresponds to their relative meritorious-
ness or shortcomings, and is therefore morally justified.
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